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Over the past three decades, a growing number of
national governments and international organizations
have taken action to promote greater awareness in gov-
ernments’ approach to the formulation, implementation
and revision of legal rules. Smart regulation tools such
as ex ante regulatory impact analysis (RIA) are being
heavily sponsored internationally, and coupled with the
promotion of stakeholder consultation and participatory
decision-making, monitoring of the implementation of
legislation, and ex post evaluation.1 Guidance documents
and overarching principles on “how to regulate” have
proliferated thanks to the work of OECD, the World
Bank and other international organizations, including
the United States Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs and the European Commission, whose Impact
Assessment Guidelines are being adopted as reference
by many EU and non-EU countries.2 Moreover, the
need for a risk-based approach to regulation and inspec-
tions, as well as enhanced attention for “cutting red
tape” – i.e. reducing administrative burdens generated
by public legislation – are becoming firmly embedded
patterns in many countries’ smart regulation agenda.3
At the same time, in particular with the financial and
economic crisis that disrupted the global economy
since 2007, the idea of “how to regulate” is undergoing
thorough revisiting. Undoubtedly, besides an array of
disastrous consequences, the crisis has also created
opportunities for a better understanding of how markets
(do not) work, and how governments can interact with
private players to achieve public policy goals more effec-
tively. One of the consequences of this trend is that the
“less is more” philosophy that dominated the 1980s
and 1990s, mostly aimed at minimizing public interfer-
ence with market forces, is no longer a dominant para-
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digm.4 The need to ensure at least regular monitoring of
market outcomes by public policymakers is considered
as a basic safeguard of social welfare: at the same time,
even the basic paradigms of competition-oriented legis-
lation, such as the liberalization of network industries,
are being challenged as potentially sub-optimal, leaving
room for intermediate solutions between the laissez faire
and “command and control” legislation.
Meanwhile, confidence in the virtues of market-gener-
ated outcomes, as well as distrust for government’s abil-
ity to regulate, has led to widespread advocacy for forms
of private regulation in lieu of public regulation. As a
legacy of this belief, most guidance documents on ex
ante policy appraisal specify that governments should
award priority to self- and co-regulatory solutions
before starting to consider more intrusive policy
approaches.5 As a result, key policy domains have
increasingly been left in the remit of private players,
with limited or no interference by public policymakers.
The trend towards increasing reliance on private govern-
ance and regulation by public policymakers is visible
also in the field that generated the current crisis, i.e.
financial markets. Consider the unfortunate decision, in
the United States, to delegate to private regulation a key
area for public policy such as the supervision of banks’
4. We refer to the idea that dominated economic theory and international
regulatory reform in the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. that reducing the
amount of regulation would trigger increases in competitiveness. A
good example is the publication by the UK Better Regulation Task
Force, titled “Regulation - Less is more. Reducing burdens, improving
outcomes”, dated March 2005.
5. See i.e. L. Senden, “Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in
European Law: Where Do They Meet?”, 9 Electronic Journal of Com-
parative Law 1, 2005 <www.ejcl.org/91/art91-3.html>; F. Saurwein,
“Regulatory Choice for Alternative Modes of Regulation: How Context
Matters, 33 Law & Policy 3, 2011, pp. 334-366. Available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1870727> or doi: <10.1111/j.1467-
9930.2011.00341.x>. Co-regulation was described by H. Van Schooten
& J. Verschuuren (eds.), International Governance and Law: State Reg-
ulations and Non-state Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008 as an ele-
ment of “non state law” backed by “some government involvement”.
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risk exposure6: the disastrous consequences of the deci-
sion to delegate risk monitoring to the private-led Con-
solidated Supervised Entities program in the US ulti-
mately led Nobel Prize Joseph Stiglitz to argue that
“self-regulation is preposterous”. And even Nicolas Sar-
kozy commented that self-regulation was finished, and
that principles-based regulation lost all its credibility in
the financial services sector.
“The problem of risk supervision in financial markets is
perhaps the single most astounding black hole of public
policy in the past century.”7 But how could such a huge
regulatory gap emerge? Some commentators have point-
ed the finger at the lack of real policy appraisal in the
US financial regulation: as a matter of fact, tools such as
RIA are not compulsory in the United States beyond
secondary legislation passed by government agencies;8
since the SEC is an independent agency, its decisions
were not subject to a publicly available, motivated eco-
nomic analysis, which would have included risk assess-
ment. However, this amounts only to a fairly incomplete
explanation: suffice it to recall that in the EU, a long,
detailed and costly Impact Assessment produced
in 2004 by the European Commission on the capital
adequacy directive that would form integral part of the
“Basel II” package, after considering the results of four
external studies, reported that “even if no regulatory
regime is able to completely eliminate the possibility for
banking crisis, the new framework should nevertheless
help reduce the frequency of such incidents”.9 As one of
us reported in a recent book, the fact that the subprime
mortgage crisis led also to a credit crunch and an eco-
nomic crisis in the EU also depends on the very bad
functioning of the large exposure reporting system fore-
seen by the “Basel II” package: in a nutshell, banks that
had limited information about their risk exposure
enjoyed relative discretion in selecting information to be
6. In 2004, after the highly contested 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
passed by the Clinton Administration – and also due to the lack of
explicit statutory authority to require investment bank holding compa-
nies to report their capital, maintain liquidity, or submit to leverage
requirements – the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created
the Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) Program as a way for global
investment bank conglomerates that lacked a supervisor under law to
voluntarily submit to regulation. This gradually led to delegating to pri-
vate banks the supervision of risk and the preservation of sustainable
banks’ debt-equity ratios, beyond the reach of public policymakers.
In 2008, the Chairman of the SEC Christopher Cox declared that “when
Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it created a significant
regulatory gap by failing to give to the SEC or any agency the authority
to regulate large investment bank holding companies, like Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear
Stearns”. He added very simply that “the last six months have made it
abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work”, and put the
CSE Program to an end.
7. SEC Chairman Cox reflected on the fact that today “a massive hole
remains: the approximately $60 trillion credit default swap (CDS) mar-
ket, which is regulated by no agency of government. Neither the SEC
nor any regulator has authority even to require minimum disclosure”.
8. A. Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU: The State of the Art and the
Art of the State, CEPS, Brussels 2006.
9. SEC (2004)921, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
of credit institutions (recast), 14 July 2007, <http://ec.europa.eu/gov-
ernance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2004/sec_2004_0921_en.pdf>.
sent to supervisory authorities: this ultimately led the
system to walk on thin ice, until the system broke
down.10
Against this background, the financial crisis can teach us
two separate lessons from the two sides of the Atlantic.
In the US, reliance on the private sector was simply ill-
conceived, especially since private players have been
invited to coordinate to solve a market failure, with no
control whatsoever on the side of government. To the
contrary, in the EU the supervision of risk exposure was
not fully delegated to the banking sector: however, pub-
lic policy was based on a badly designed reporting sys-
tem, which – although compulsory – led to an exacerba-
tion of information distortion in the system. With a
degree of over-simplification, one could say there was a
failure of private regulation in the US, and a failure of
public regulation and oversight in the EU.
The recent history of financial markets, though certain-
ly being the “poster child” of this uncertain generation
of public policy, is however only the tip of a much larger
iceberg. Although private governance is often aimed at
ensuring the (private) production of public goods, com-
mentators have started to spot cases in which reliance on
private regulation is either excessive or misplaced.
Examples are numerous, and relate to a wide spectrum
of policy domains: from the “Action Plan” implemented
in the US by the Utilities Solid Wastes Activity Group
(USWAG) to foster the adoption of strict standards for
groundwater safety;11 to the obscure effects of wide-
spread public-private interaction in crucial initiatives
such as the Africa Stockpiles Programme;12 to the fail-
ure of private regulation to keep down international
roaming tariffs in the EU (which led to action being tak-
en by the Commission in 2007); and to many examples
of self-regulation, e.g. in legal professions and pension
schemes.
So, should we just get rid of the idea that private players
can be good regulators? The answer, of course, is no. As
a matter of fact, there is widespread agreement on the
fact that many forms of private governance pursue high-
ly desirable goals from a societal perspective.13 For
example, voluntary certification and standardization
bodies often aim at re-allocating entitlements, solving
collective action problems and raising the awareness of
end consumers on the respect of minimum health- or
environment- related standards. In some cases, private
players decide to coordinate in order to solve market
failures that governments are unable to tackle; in other
cases, private regulation aims at fixing government fail-
ures, especially when international supply chains pene-
trate territories with very weak rule of law enforce-
10. Renda 2011; FSB, Larosiere report, Turner report.
11. In 2008, a chain of events led to the collapse of an earthen dam in Ten-
nessee, and a toxic stew containing 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash
inundated a portion of Roane County and contaminated a river cours-
ing through a far larger region of Appalachia (quote)
12. R. Falkner, “Private Environmental Governance and International Rela-
tions: Exploring the Links”, 3 Global Environmental Politics 2, 2003,
pp. 72-88.
13. More generally, an important difference can be established between
industry-led and NGO-led private regulatory schemes.
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ments; in other cases, private players organize to avoid
that public regulators step into a specific policy area to
regulate directly; and in yet another range of cases, pri-
vate players coordinate to achieve socially undesirable
goals, such as collective boycotts, cartels, exchange of
information among competitors and other anticompeti-
tive behavior.14
Against this background, what creates concern is that
public bodies seem to have developed no means to
design collaborative forms to control the evolution of
public/private governance. This paper thus seeks to lay
the foundations for a better understanding of private
governance for public policy purposes. Section 1 below
briefly summarizes the main reasons for the emergence
of private governance and its justification from a theo-
retical perspective. Section 2 provides a taxonomy of
existing forms of private governance. Section 3
describes current trends, including the emergence of
meta-private regulators that aim at bridging the gap
between public policy and private governance. Section 4
concludes by proposing a theoretical framework for the
assessment of private governance by public policymak-
ers.
1. Private Governance: A
Theoretical Framework
The variety of private regulatory schemes in place is
remarkable, encompassing i.e. common rules, memoran-
dums of understanding, regulatory contracts, codes of
conduct and voluntary agreements by which economic
actors, social players, NGOs and organized groups
establish themselves voluntarily to regulate and organize
their activities.15 In some cases, private regulation
emerges spontaneously, independently of any legislative
or policy initiative (e.g., in the case of forestry where was
the failure of reaching consensus at the Rio conference
in 1992, or advertising codes of conduct). In other cases,
it blossoms as a response to the threat of command and
control regulation (e.g., industry agreements on passive
safety measures for cars; Responsible Care; the ICC
Business Charter for Sustainable Development; the
14. F. Cafaggi, New foundations of transnational private regulation, EUI
w.p. Private regulation series, 2010.
15. As reported by Vogel (D. Vogel, “The Private Regulation of Global Cor-
porate Conduct: Achievements and Limitations”, 49 Business Society
2010, p. 68), there are now more than 300 industry or product codes,
nearly all of which address labor or environmental practices; many sec-
tors and products are governed by multiple codes. More than
3,000 global firms now regularly issue reports on the social and envi-
ronmental practices and many of these firms have developed their own
codes and/or subscribe to one or more industry or cross-industry codes.
The largest private business code, the UN Global Compact, has more
than 3,500 corporate signatories. More than 2,300 global firms have
endorsed the Business Charter for Sustainable Development developed
by the International Chamber of Commerce and more
than 46,000 firms have been certified as complaint with ISO 14001, an
environmental process standard. More than 70 major global financial
institutions from 16 countries, representing assets of 4.5 trillion dollars,
have signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment.
global confectionary industry’s code of conduct banning
forced child labor; or even the failed attempt to strike a
co-regulatory deal to set pan-European, affordable
roaming tariffs for the use of the mobile phone across
EU member states).16 In yet another set of cases, private
regulation takes the form of an industry association with
a specific mission and a management board that even
represents external interests, in order to ensure align-
ment with the public interest, often as a result from
public opinion campaigns (so-called “naming and sham-
ing”, sometimes also aimed at individual companies,
such as Starbucks or Nestlé). Finally, in some cases pri-
vate regulation simply hides a cartel (e.g., in antitrust
cases such as i.e. Allied tube and cases of collective boy-
cott involving industry associations).17
Against this background, academics have traditionally
shown very little faith in the virtues of private regula-
tion: as observed by Anthony Ogus, “self-regulation,
understood narrowly as law formulated by private agen-
cies to govern professional and trading activities, has
been rigorously criticized by lawyers and economists
alike”.18 Some lawyers tend to see it as an example of
modern corporatism, whereas economists tend to spot
traces of collusion in most private regulatory schemes;
political science frames private regulation either from
the perspective of transaction cost politics, in which
public policymakers delegate certain functions to private
regulators;19 or as the result of rent-seeking behavior.20
Overall, the potential for abuse has been highlighted by
scholars from all social sciences.21 At the same time, this
traditional approach is believed to have been excessively
16. Responsible Care was adopted by several national chemical industry
associations in part to forestall national laws establishing more stringent
plant safety standards following the Union Carbide chemical plant
explosion at Bhopal, India, in 1984. The International Chamber of Com-
merce’s Business Charter for Sustainable Development was initiated by
global firms who feared that the 1992 Rio “Earth Summit” would lead
to an expansion of global environmental regulations. The global confec-
tionary industry adopted a code of conduct banning forced child labor
in part as a response to the threat of American trade sanctions on
imports of cocoa from West Africa. During the 1990s, many apparel
producers and retailers endorsed voluntary international labor standards
to secure Congressional support for the renewal of China’s most
favored nation status as a trading partner. See Vogel 2010.
17. I. Maher, “Competition Law and Transnational Private Regulatory
Regimes: Marking the Cartel Boundary”, in Scott, Cafaggi & Senden,
Journal of Law and Society Special Issue, April 2011, The Challenge of
Trans-National Private Regulation: Conceptual and Constitutional
Debates.
18. A. Ogus, “Rethinking Self-Regulation”, 15 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 1995, pp. 97-108.
19. D. Epstein & S. O’Halloran, Delegating Powers. A Transaction Cost Pol-
itics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers, Cambridge
University Press 1999; C. Tuohy & A. Wolfson, “Self-Regulation: Who
Qualifies?”, in P. Slayton & M.J. Trebilcock (eds.), The Professions and
Public Policy, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, Toronto 1978.
20. G. Tullock, “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft”, 5
Western Economic Journal 1967, pp. 224-232.
21. A.C. Page, “Self-Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension”, 49 Mod-
ern Law Review 1986, pp. 141-167; P. Cane, “Self Regulation and
Judicial Review”, 6 Civil Justice Quarterly 1987, pp. 324-347; I. Hard-
en & N. Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of
Law, Hutchinson, New York 1986; Ogus 1995, pp. 97-108; A. Shaked
& J. Sutton, “The Self-Regulating Profession”, 47 Review of Economic
Studies 1981, pp. 217-234.
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partisan vis-à-vis private regulation: recent efforts to
analyze the emergence of private regulatory schemes has
led to a more nuanced and balanced approach to this
form of governance, especially with respect to NGOs-
driven private regulatory schemes and the growing
number of multi-stakeholder initiatives at transnational
level.22
Today, the role of private governance schemes is again
under the spotlight, mostly since traditional forms of
public intervention are facing enormous, and probably
insurmountable difficulties in coping with certain policy
problems. The weaknesses of public regulation emerge
more specifically at the transnational level where diffi-
culties to coordinate, inconsistency between standard
setting and enforcement, divergences between adminis-
trative and judicial enforcement and within the latter
among domestic courts make transnational public regu-
lation an insufficient response. We refer in particular to
three outstanding policy domains.
Firstly, there are goods and services that transcend
national boundaries and as such do not lend themselves
easily to direct regulation by national policymakers.
This is mostly the case of international public goods,
(e.g., deforestation, emission reduction), for which
international regulatory cooperation is heavily needed,
in particular since absent coordination a “race to the
bottom” occurs, which can lead to disastrous outcomes
such as a “tragedy of the commons”.23 Early experiences
such as the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) and
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) have filled an
enormous policy gap created by the lack of international
cooperation. Only recently, as testified by forthcoming
work at the OECD, the need to strengthen international
regulatory cooperation has been placed under the spot-
light in the global policy community.
Secondly, there are markets that exhibit very fast-
changing dynamics – so fast-changing that public poli-
cymakers become awkward when trying to regulate
them. This is the case, in particular, of high-tech and
knowledge-intensive markets, in which the fast pace of
change and the highly technical nature of the informa-
tion needed to regulate effectively leads policymakers
with the need to rely on private parties, at least for the
definition of implementing measures and technical spec-
22. A.K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Means of Govern-
ance, Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ 2004; F. Cafaggi, La
responsabilité des regulateurs privés, RIDE, 2005; F. Cafaggi, Self-regu-
lation in European private law, Kluwer 2006; F. Cafaggi, New Founda-
tions of Transnational Private Regulation, EUI w.p. Private Regulation
Series 2010; Senden 2005; K.W. Abbott & D. Snidal, “Strengthening
International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance:
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit”, 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Trans-
national Law 2009, p. 501; T. Büthe, “Private Regulation in the Global
Economy: A (P)Review", (Guest editor's introduction to a special issue
on 'Private Regulation in the Global Economy') 12 Business and Politics
2010; T. Büthe & W. Mattli, New Global Rulers: The Privatization of
Regulation in the World Economy, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, NJ 2011; Scott, Cafaggi & Senden, The Challenge of Trans-Nation-
al Private Regulation, Journal of Law and Society Special Issue,
April 2011.
23. G. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, 162 Science 1968,
No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248.
ifications. Examples include, but are not limited to,
standardization policy, international roaming, net neu-
trality regulation, cloud computing, privacy on the
Internet, and Internet governance.
Thirdly, as a residual category, there are policy prob-
lems that inevitably require heavy reliance on the exper-
tise of private actors, since the latter are the most
informed parties, or the best positioned players to fix a
given failure, or simply the only parties holding control
over given, essential resources. These fields include
widely diverse policy domains, such as (again) financial
risk regulation, but also sustainability reporting and
critical infrastructure protection, in which an estimated
85% of critical infrastructure is in private hands.24
Against this background, the origins of private govern-
ance schemes can be related to various causes and moti-
vations, which can be broadly classified as follows.
• Signaling. Some private governance schemes
respond to signals sent by the market or by civil soci-
ety (e.g., sustainability reporting, ethical trading,
environmental protection and business “greenwash-
ing”, respect of labour rights, child labour etc.).25
These include schemes that emerge due to the need
to sustainably govern common resources (e.g., in the
case of the FSC and the MSC).26
• Controlling the value chain. Other schemes were
created due to the need to control the supply chain,
especially in the case of large retailers relying on
local suppliers in countries with very weak rule of
law (e.g., the GlobalGAP scheme, corporate social
responsibility, food safety). In the area of food safety
the adoption of the supply chain approach by public
regulation earlier in Europe and later in the US has
delegated and empowered large MNC with the regu-
latory power and responsibility to control safety
along the chain.27 In the area of CSR codes are often
implemented via contracting as illustrated by the
24. Renda 2010.
25. The term “greenwashing” is used to refer to cases in which
which green marketing is deceptively used to promote the perception
that an organization's aims and policies are environmentally friendly.
American environmentalist Jay Westerveld coined the term in 1986 in
response to a hotel’s efforts to encourage guests to help the environ-
ment by reusing towels. See, for an application to the oil market,
M.A. Cherry & J.F. Sneirson, “Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth
of ‘Green Oil Companies’”, 3 Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Envi-
ronment 2012, pp. 133-154.
26. See, for an introduction to the governance of common resources, F. van
Waarden, “Governing Global Commons: Public-Private-Protection of
Fish and Forests”, in J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, M. Maertens & A. Marx
(eds.), Private Standards and Global Governance. Legal and Economic
Perspectives, Edgar Elgar , Cheltenham 2010. And for applications to
the MSC and FSC, see F. Gale & M. Haward, “Public accountability in
private regulation: contrasting models of the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) and Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)”, Refereed paper present-
ed to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference Universi-
ty of Adelaide, 29 September-1 October 2004 and D. Curtin & L. Sen-
den, “Public Accountability of Transnational Private Regulation: Chi-
mera or Reality?”, 38 Journal of Law and Society 1, 2011 pp. 163-188.
27. G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey & T. Sturgeon, “The Governance of Global Val-
ue Chains”, Review of International Political Economy 2005; F. Cafag-
gi, “New foundations of transnational private regulation”, Journal of
Law and Society 2011 p. 20 et seq.
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case of private service military company and by pri-
vate security services.28
• Complementing public regulation. Some private
governance initiatives emerge as a complement to
existing public policy, to facilitate implementation
and compliance with existing public regulation.
Institutional complementarity between private and
public emerge at standard setting level, monitoring
and enforcement.29 This is the case, i.e. of the “new
approach” to standardization in force in the EU
since Directive 98/34 of 22 June 1998.30 Also, to
some extent GlobalGAP can be seen as complement-
ing existing public regulation.31
• Replacing/pre-empting public regulation. There
are private governance schemes that were created
with a clear objective to pre-empt and avoid public
regulation. This approach is often labeled private
regulation in the shadow of legislation,32 and can be
observed, i.e. in several environmental regimes.
• Inter-firm coordination and co-opetition. Some
forms of private governance are dictated by the need
to enhance inter-firm coordination for pro-competi-
tive purposes. This is typically the example of patent
pools.33
• Collusion/mutual benefit. Some private gover-
nance arrangements can also hide strategic anti-com-
petitive purposes, as is the case for collective boycott
schemes and cartels. Also, existing (and often con-
cealed) private agreements between content provid-
ers and ISPs for the purpose of enabling copyright
infringement in cyberspace often go beyond what
public regulation would entail, especially in terms of
copyright scope and respect for user privacy and net-
work neutrality.
28. F. Francioni & N. Ronzitti, War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitar-
ian Law, and Private Contractors, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2011; L.A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace, Preserving
Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs, Yale University
Press, New Haven 2011.
29. F. Cafaggi, Self-regulation in European Private Law, Kluwer 2006;
Cafaggi 2010.
30. H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards
in the Regulation of Integrating Markets, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005.
31. See, i.e., K. Sorsa, Private-regulation in global value chain – a trade
barrier or an opportunity for public-private co-operation? Available
online at <http://regulation.upf.edu/dublin-10-papers/1H4.pdf>, stat-
ing that “without GlobalGAP, farmers and exporters in DCs would have
to come to grips themselves with complicated EU regulations on food
safety and those of the member states as well”, and that in this sense,
“private food schemes help to reduce the transaction costs by making
information about European regulations on food safety systematically
available and practically achievable”, <http://regulation.upf.edu/dub-
lin-10-papers/1H4.pdf>.
32. A. Héritier, “New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-making with-
out Legislating?”, in A. Héritier (ed.), Common Goods: Reinventing
European and International Governance, Rowman & Littlefield, Lang-
ham 2002, pp.185-206.
33. J. Lerner & J. Tirole, Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection,
2004-711; NBER Working Paper 9175, September 2002; R. Merges,
“Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collec-
tive Rights Organizations”, 84 California Law Review 5, 1996,
pp. 1293-1393; N. Gallini, Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent
Rights: The Case of Patent Pools, IEL Paper in Comparative Analysis of
Institutions, Economics and Law no. 5, 2011.
The most appropriate public policy approach towards
these various forms of private governance is of course
different, depending on the motivation for its creation.
This is why, in order to develop a theoretical framework
for the assessment of private regulatory schemes, it is
essential to develop a taxonomy of such schemes, so that
tailored policy appraisal tools can be designed.
1.1  Building a Taxonomy of Private
Governance
As already recalled above, any attempt to reach a com-
plete taxonomy of existing forms of private governance
is inevitably doomed to remain incomplete. So far,
authors such as Abbott and Snidal (2009) have tried to
reach an operational taxonomy by distinguishing exist-
ing schemes based on the nature of their participants.
Figure 1 shows their “governance triangle”, in which a
large number of governance organizations are located
along a triangular space based on the relative prevalence
of State actors, NGOs or private firms. In addition, we
have highlighted a number of areas, namely the area of
business associations, such as the International Chamber
of Commerce, which produce relevant private regula-
tion i.e. in the form of codes of conducts; and the top
area of the triangle, which hosts forms of International
Regulatory Cooperation such as the OECD and other
forms, which the OECD itself is currently studying.
Most of the private governance schemes we have been
discussing and defining in the previous pages are any-
way located in the middle-lower area of the triangle: in
the figure, we have highlighted the Forest Stewardship
Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, and the
Global Reporting Initiative.
However, the taxonomy developed by Abbott and Sni-
dal (2009) based on the nature of participants provides
an insufficient basis for the evaluation of the effective-
ness and the welfare-enhancing nature of private gover-
nance schemes. More recent attempts by the same
authors have led to the definition of a different frame-
work, which refers to the phases of the policy cycle car-
ried out by the scheme under scrutiny. Figure 2 shows
an elaboration on the so-called ANIME framework,
which distinguishes between forms of private gover-
nance and the phases of the policy cycle in which these
forms become active. Under this theoretical framework,
some private governance schemes focus on specific steps
of the policy process, such as enforcement and compli-
ance. One typical example is conservation and land
trusts, or forms of regulation by contract that aim most-
ly at fostering compliance where litigation would prove
costly, unpredictable or simply impossible. Other forms
of private regulation mostly focus on the setting of tech-
nical standards, as is the case of CSR schemes incorpo-
rating ISO standards. Other organizations focus either
on the implementation of existing public regulation, or
on monitoring and compliances. To the contrary, there
are some types of organizations that replace public poli-
cy in all its aspects, including the setting of the over-
arching agenda in a given policy field.
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1.2 Regulation as a Form of Public-Private
Cooperation: A Transaction Cost Politics
Approach
From a theoretical perspective, the emergence of private
schemes that govern private behavior beyond, and often
independently of, public legislation can be approached
from a variety of perspectives – although in reality,
almost none of them has been fully applied to this issue.
First, an important precondition for delegating the ach-
ievement of public policy goals to private governance is
a vision of the “art of the state” that is focused on facili-
tating the interaction of private parties, rather than on
command and control regulation. This is typically a leg-
acy of the work of Ronald Coase34 and, even more
importantly, the subsequent elaboration by Guido Cala-
bresi and Douglas Melamed,35 which led to the identifi-
cation of certain private institutions – so-called “rule 4”
34. R.H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, 3 Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 1960, pp. 1-44.
35. G. Calabresi & A.D. Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral”, 85 Harvard Law Review 1972,
p. 1089.
Figure 1. The Governance Triangle in Abbot and Snidal (2009)
Figure 2. Functional Typologies: The ANIME Framework
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organizations – that emerge with the specific purpose to
reallocate entitlements and thus save on transaction
costs.36 In addition, the literature on the optimal govern-
ance of common resources suggests that private parties
can interact to efficiently correct market failures and
optimize governance of common resources, avoiding
risk of depletion.37
But even more notably, a very useful way of looking at
the potential for private regulation to achieve public
policy goals is an adaptation of the “Williamsonian”,
“make or buy” approach, which sees private governance
as the result of an implicit decision to externalize a given
phase of the policy process. Just like private businesses
decide whether to insource or outsource a give part of
the production process based on a comparison between
administrative costs and transaction costs, the choice of
private regulation would emerge in a policy decision
only where evidence suggests that this is the most cost-
effective way of achieving a given policy outcome; or
whenever this option maximizes net benefits. In choos-
ing private regulation, then governments should take
into account the public interest – something for which it
was democratically appointed.
From a more theoretical standpoint, private regulation
can thus emerge in two main forms: (i) when civil soci-
ety directly empowers private regulators for the achieve-
ment of socially desirable results (see, e.g., Ostrom38);
and (ii) when civil society ‘delegates’ regulatory powers
to government, and the latter decides to delegate regula-
tory activities to private players through self- or co-reg-
ulation. In this latter case a “double delegation” scenario
occurs, where delegation by government is based on dif-
ferent rationales compared to the initial delegation made
by civil society. When this happens, government must
also guarantee the achievement of public policy goals by
creating and implementing monitoring mechanisms and
procedures, which become a safeguard for civil society
as a whole.
This view is consistent with the view adopted by the
“transaction cost politics” approach, in which the regu-
latory activity is seen as a principal-agent problem,
where the principal (government or Parliament) dele-
gates regulatory power to an agent (public or private);
and the latter regulates under the supervision of the for-
mer.39 In our case, the ultimate principal is always civil
society: governments are agents with respect to citizens,
and become principals when delegating powers to public
agencies, ministers, or private regulators. At the same
time, this approach is consistent with the so-called
“institutional complementarity” concept developed in
36. I. Ayres, Optional Law. The Structure of Legal Entitlements, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago 2005; Roberts 2011.
37. Hardin 1968; M. Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Own-
ership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives, Basic Books,
New York 2008; E. Ostrom. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of
Institutional Forms of Collective Action, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, MA 1990; E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversi-
ty, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2005.
38. E. Ostrom, “Coping With Tragedies of the Commons”, 2 Annual
Review of Political Science 1, 1999, pp. 493-535.
39. Epstein & O’Halloran 1999.
comparative law and institutional analysis.40 This
implies that public and private regulation emerge
through co-evolution patterns, which ultimately select
“who does what” to address societal problems.41 In our
case, most co-evolution mechanisms do not select either
public or private regulation: rather, in most cases the
two interact and merge into hybrid forms, where some
of the phases of the policy cycle are performed by dele-
gated political agents; and other by private parties.
Against this background, private regulation can prove
more effective than public regulation for a number of
reasons: for example, according to Coglianese et al.,42
self-regulatory schemes possess a number of potential
advantages over command and control regulation, such
as (i) proximity (being closer to the industry being regu-
lated); (ii) flexibility (absence of political and adminis-
trative constraints); (iii) greater compliance; and (iv)
greater potential to mobilize resources. Potential disad-
vantages include conflicts of interest, inadequate
enforcement and accountability, and insufficient moni-
toring of compliance. From the perspective of internal
governance, Balleisen and Eisner (2009) argue that
“the effectiveness of private regulation in a particular
context or, more precisely, the potential for credible
co-regulation depends on the following five factors:
(1) the depth of concern for their reputation among
regulated businesses; (2) the relevance of flexibility in
regulatory detail; (3) the existence of sufficient
bureaucratic capacity and autonomy on the part of
nongovernmental regulators; (4) the degree of trans-
parency in regulatory process; and (5) the seriousness
of accountability. Before legislators or regulatory
agencies choose to delegate regulatory authority to
industry organizations or corporations, they should
assess the regulatory lay of the land with respect to
each of these issues”.
This theoretical approach enables a better understand-
ing of the diverse combinations of public and private
regulation that can be observed and designed in the real
world: from pure command and control regulation to
hybrid forms of public-private cooperation and “new
approaches”, to purely private schemes.43 From this
perspective, it becomes clear that for any private govern-
ance scheme to be viable from a public policy perspec-
tive, regardless of whether it is a spontaneous scheme or
a policy-induced scheme, a suitable monitoring mechan-
ism must be in place for public policymakers to be able
40. M. Aoki, Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford 2001; Cafaggi 2006; Cafaggi 2010.
41. R.D. Lipschutz & C. Fogel, “Regulation for the Rest of US: Global Civil
Society and the Privatization of Transnational Regulation”, in T.J. Bier-
steker, R.B. Hall & C.N. Murphy (eds.), The Emergence of Private
Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA 2002.
42. C. Coglianese, T.J. Healey, E.K. Keating & M.L. Michael, “The Role of
Government in Corporate Governance”, Regulatory Policy Program
Report RPP-08, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 2004.
43. Cafaggi 2006; Cafaggi 2010.
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to observe whether the behavior of private regulators is
sufficiently aligned with the public interest: the devel-
opment of a framework for evaluating private govern-
ance in the form of self- or co-regulatory schemes is the
overarching goal of this paper. Section 2 below deals
with the definition of the key features of private regula-
tion, focusing in particular on the effectiveness dimen-
sion. Section 3 outlines a potential theoretical frame-
work for the incorporation of ad hoc assessment tools in
the EU policy process.
2 Evaluating Private
Governance: A Focus on
Effectiveness
In the past two decades, significant effort has been
devoted to the definition of the key features of private
governance schemes, and in particular those adopted
within trans-national private regulation. In the academic
literature, four key dimensions are normally identified:44
quality, legitimacy, enforcement and effectiveness.
Quality is normally measured in terms of the traditional
criteria applied to formal legislation, i.e. certainty, pre-
dictability, lack of ambiguity, flexibility, efficacy, malle-
ability etc. These potentially conflicting requirements
imply that high quality norms will often occupy the
middle ground between both extremes. Moreover,
good-quality private norms should also not upset the
coherency of existing, usually formal, regulatory sys-
tem(s).45
Legitimacy, on the other hand, is often described as
referring to the degree of responsiveness, inclusiveness
and representativeness of the private regulatory scheme.
It includes both a substantive and procedural dimen-
sion. Authors have distinguished i.e. between political
legitimacy and democratic legitimacy;46 as well as
between input and output legitimacy;47 or the emerging
“derivative legitimacy” in times of extensive interlink-
ing between private regulatory bodies.48 Established
theories of legitimacy consider whether the organiza-
tions are representative, inclusive and procedurally fair.
44. See Cafaggi 2010.
45. A private norm may be particularly effective and of high quality, yet still
conflict with existing regulatory regimes, e.g. other private or public
regimes.
46. S. Bernstein, “Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State Global
Governance, 18 Review of International Political Economy 1, 2011,
pp. 17-51.
47. “Input legitimacy” focuses on the means by which constituents partici-
pate in a private regulatory scheme, e.g., representation, inclusiveness
or process. Output-legitimacy represents those paradigms that focus on
substantive outcomes, e.g. trade liberalization, or fairness, and whether
goals set by the private regulatory scheme are reached. In this respect,
output legitimacy is very similar to effectiveness. See F. Scharpf, Gov-
erning in Europe: effective and democratic?, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 1999 and <www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/
Nonstate/Paper-Elsig-Amalric.pdf>.
48. C.R. Kelly, “Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy”, 29 Mich-
igan Journal of International Law 2008, p. 605; Casey and Scott 2011.
Private regulatory organizations that satisfy the legiti-
macy criteria articulated in these theories can claim
legitimacy and expect greater compliance as a result.49
A variety of enforcement mechanisms exist with regard to
private norms, such as arbitration, mediation, incorpo-
ration in court decisions as well as more sociologically
informed methods (i.e. forms of peer pressure, market-
based strategies using reputation and “naming and
shaming” mechanisms). Enforcement is often the out-
come of complementary strategies deploying judicial
and non-judicial mechanisms across different jurisdic-
tional levels.50 Moreover, enforcement of private norms
must be considered in relation to public regulation and
public oversight. There is an increasing role of agencies
in overseeing compliance with transnational standard
setting: examples range from accounting standards to
advertising, from payment to food safety, from employ-
ment to non discrimination standards. To what extent is
or should the state be involved in enforcing private
norms? How do norm conflicts between public and pri-
vate norms affect the process of enforcement?
Finally, effectiveness can be defined as the consistency
between means and goals and extent to which private
regulation achieves its objectives. Effectiveness ‘meas-
ures’ ex ante the proportionality between means and
ends and ex post the positive or negative impact of the
regulatory measure over the different constituencies
including regulated parties and beneficiaries. It con-
cerns the entire regulatory process from standard setting
to enforcement. Effectiveness can be predicated upon
either private as well as public norms, or as it often hap-
pens a combination of both. Indeed, one of the cardinal
issues raised in this paper is which type of norms, or
which combination of norms and institutions (as well as
under which circumstances), leads to the highest degree
of effectiveness, i.e. the highest degree of compliance
with the stated objectives. Often the correlation between
norms and institutions is not sufficiently highlighted
and effectiveness is measured in relation to norms
regardless of the institutional framework. The OECD51
approach suggests on the contrary that effectiveness
should be evaluated in the light of an integrated analysis
including rules and institutions.
As a matter of fact, these four dimensions are tightly
interrelated, to the extent that disentangling them can
prove very challenging. To be sure, there are significant
interdependencies between them: legitimacy can foster
compliance, which facilitates enforcement and ultimate-
ly increases effectiveness; effectiveness, in turn, contrib-
utes to legitimacy (so-called “output” legitimacy). How-
ever, this interrelation includes important conflicts and
trade-offs: for example, improving legitimacy through
representation, voice and accountability can in some
cases undermine effectiveness by increasing transaction
49. Curtin & Senden 2011.
50. Cafaggi 2011.
51. OECD (2011/2012), “Making the most of public investment in a tight
fiscal environment: Multi-level governance lessons from the crisis”,
OECD Working Paper, Paris, 2011, available at <www.oedc.org/docu-
menten/36/1,3746_en2649_34413_48713444_1_1_1_1,00.html>.
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and compliance costs, slowing down the regulatory pro-
cess, diluting enforcement and ossifying private rules.52
In other circumstances higher efficiency reducing exter-
nalities can improve legitimacy.
From the viewpoint of a participant to a private regula-
tory scheme, the key dimension is effectiveness, defined
as the extent to which the organization achieves its own
stated goals. This, in turn, can be obtained through
high-quality norms that are strongly enforced, and
through a high degree of legitimacy. Legitimacy, in
turn, can increase the likelihood that other participants
will respect the rules of the private organization: in this
respect, legitimacy can transform private rules into
“focal points”, thence reducing transaction costs and
making the success of an organization more likely.53
The effectiveness of private regulation can be described
in analytical terms as a function of output, outcome and
impact,54 plus broader political and socio-economic
effects.55 More precisely, the output is the direct result
of the activity carried out by the private regulatory
scheme, such as a standard, a set of rules or a specific
policy. The outcome refers to the overall regulatory
objectives, including the behavioral changes of regulated
and third parties that occur as a result of the activity
undertaken. Finally, if one looks also at the broader
social, economic and environmental consequences of the
activity carried out by the private regulators, then the
“impact” of private regulation emerges. These determi-
nants of effectiveness can in turn be broken down based
on their main drivers. Accordingly, output can be
described along the dimensions of stringency and com-
prehensiveness;56 outcome can be explained through the
degree of compliance with the rules, the participation of
stakeholders (inclusiveness, representativeness) and the
existence of potential lock-in effects due, e.g., to reliance
on one specific standard in a context of quick technolog-
ical development. Finally, the impact of a private regu-
52. See partly Kelly (2008). On the concept of ossification, see T.O. McGar-
ity, “Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform”, 65 Texas Law
Review 1243, 1987, and F. Cafaggi, “Private regulation in European
private law”, in A.S. Hartkamp et al., Towards a European Civil Code
(4th ed.) Kluwer Law International 2011.
53. See A. Kalfagianni & P. Pattberg, “The Marine Stewardship Council”, 2
Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, p. 2, quoting also
C. Cutler, V. Haufler & T. Porter, Private Authority and International
Affairs, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999.
54. D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, New York 1965;
D. Fuchs, “Transnational Corporations and Global Governance: The
Effectiveness of Private Governance”, in Stefan Schirm (ed.), Globaliza-
tion. State of the Art of Research and Perspectives, Routledge, Lon-
don 2006.
55. K. Dingwerth & P. Pattberg, “Global Governance as a Perspective on
World Politics”, 12 Global Governance 2006, pp. 185-203.
56. Stringency, as reported in Kalfagianni (2010), refers to the degree to
which a given private governance scheme requires actors to implement
behavioural changes (G. Auld, L.H. Gulbrandsen & C.L. McDermott,
“Certification Schemes and the Impacts on Forests and Forestry”, 33
Annual Review of Environment and Resources 2008, pp. 187-211). At
the same time, stringency differs according to whether management-
system-based or performance standards are adopted, and the ambition
of performance standards (D. Fuchs, “Transnational Corporations and
Global Governance: The Effectiveness of Private Governance”, in
S. Schirm (ed.), Globalization. State of the Art of Research and Perspec-
tives, Routledge, London 2006).
latory scheme refers to its added value in achieving its
objectives compared to the counterfactual, i.e. the next
best alternative to that form of private regulatory
scheme. Beyond the impact of private regulation in
terms of “problem-solving”, some authors57 have fur-
ther distinguished between measures of success such as:
material and structural effects, cognitive effects, and
normative effects.58
When looking at the interface between public and pri-
vate regulation, however, these concepts are not suffi-
cient to provide policymakers with a comprehensive
theoretical framework.59 In particular, public policy-
makers are normally interested in a different outcome,
which certainly encompasses, but is not limited to legiti-
macy and effectiveness.60 From a transaction cost poli-
tics perspective (see section 1.2 above), a public policy-
maker will opt for delegating the solution of a given pol-
icy problem to private regulation whenever this repre-
sents the most “effective” way to achieve that goal.
However, this notion of effectiveness (defined as the
extent to which private regulatory schemes achieve
socially optimal or desirable outcomes61) may be differ-
ent from the one sought by private actors involved in
private regulatory schemes. Occasionally, these two
notions of effectiveness can coincide; but in many
instances they may diverge – hence the skepticism of
many social scientists when it comes to evaluating pri-
vate regulation.
57. Dingwerth & Pattberg 2006; Kalfagianni & Pattberg 2010.
58. Kalfagianni & Pattberg (2010) refer to first-order and second-order
effects to distinguish between impacts and material, cognitive and nor-
mative effects.
59. It is important to observe that different private governance schemes can
define effectiveness in different ways: for example, emerging definitions
given by ISEAL and the GFSI differ noticeably from the ones given by
multi-national corporations for the purposes of their own CSR activity.
But generally, one can say that effectiveness is always defined as the
ability of a given private governance scheme to achieved its own statu-
tory goal.
60. Effectiveness is not commonly used in ex ante RIA, although recently
the European Commission has started using effectiveness as a criterion
against which to rank and discard options before a more in-depth anal-
ysis. In this context, effectiveness is used in combination with other two
criteria (“efficiency” and “coherence”). To the contrary, the notion of
“effectiveness” in public policy appraisal is mostly used in ex post eval-
uation, where the quality and performance of a given piece of legisla-
tion is appraised in terms of “relevance” (i.e. the extent to which the
objectives of public intervention proved appropriate with respect to the
funds available, the needs perceived and the specific problems the inter-
vention was meant to solve); “efficiency” (i.e. “cost-effectiveness”, or
how economically have the various inputs been converted into outputs
and results and whether the expected effects have been obtained at a
reasonable cost); “usefulness” (i.e. whether the impacts achieved by an
intervention correspond to the needs and problems identified at the
outset); and finally “effectiveness” (i.e. the extent to which the effects
of a given programme have contributed to the achievement of the spe-
cific objectives of the intervention).
61. This is why effectiveness is normally linked to explicitly stated general,
specific and operational objectives in the ex ante IAs of the European
Commission. The specification of objectives has become much more
common in Commission IAs over the past few years, and the Communi-
cation on smart regulation of October 2010 placed even more emphasis
on the need to define “SMART” objectives in ex ante policy appraisal
documents, so that achievement of those objectives can be monitored
over time, including in ex post evaluation.
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Cases in which “private” and “social” effectiveness
diverge can be of many different types. For example,
collective action in private regulatory bodies can aim at
socially sub-optimal outcomes. For example, a cartel can
be very effective in achieving its stated goal but exter-
nalize costs on third parties.62 Participants would join
the cartel to the extent that they think the cartel is likely
to be successful, i.e. would achieve its goal of increasing
participants’ profits without being uncovered by anti-
trust authorities. However, from a public policy per-
spective a cartel is undesirable since it leads to restric-
tions of output and/or increases in price levels, to the
detriment of consumers and often also other actors
along the value chain.
A more general case is that of negative externalities, i.e.
cases in which the coordination of activities between
members of a private regulatory scheme leads to non-
internalized negative effects on non-members, even if
such effects are unintentional. This is even more likely
to be the case whenever the governance of private regu-
latory organizations is not inclusive of all potentially
affected stakeholders – as we explain in section 3 below,
GlobalGap is an example of under-representation of
developing countries, which end up being negatively
affected by the activity of the private regulatory body.
Another problem may emerge whenever the scope of the
private regulatory scheme is narrower than the impacts
generated by the activity of its participants: for example
private regulation aimed at compliance with safety stand-
ards might have, say, unintended environmental conse-
quences; private regulation of Internet security stand-
ards might affect the users’ freedom of expression or
their right to privacy.63
Finally, there might be cases in which the private regu-
latory scheme is aimed at achieving socially desirable
outcomes, but either adverse selection problems or lack
of monitoring and compliance lead to the emerge of
socially undesirable outcomes. An example is provided
by Lennox and Nash,64 who describe the Responsible
Care initiative launched by the Chemical Manufactur-
er’s Association (CMA) in 1989 in response to growing
public criticism of the industry: the fact that the CMA
did not require third party review or certification of
firm performance and did not adopt explicit sanctions
for non-compliance led to a perverse situation in which
participants in Responsible Care were more polluting on
average than other chemical firms in the United
62. See Maher 2011.
63. F. Cafaggi, “New foundations of transnational private regulation”, 38
Journal of Law and Society 1, 2011, p. 20 et seq.
64. M. Lennox & J. Nash, “Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selec-
tion”, 12 Business Strategy and the Environment 2003, pp. 1-14.
States.65 Similarly, Morgenstern and Pizer66 in review-
ing a number of voluntary programs in the environmen-
tal field express concern on the self-selection of partici-
pants into those schemes.
The potential misalignment between private benefits
and social welfare can be addressed by designing appro-
priate indicators that would make ex ante clear when
regulatory choices pursue one or the other strategy.
Some sectoral experiences (advertising, environment)
and some general guidelines (GRI, ISEAL) suggest that
two families of indicators can provide guidance to align
private benefits and social welfare: governance and per-
formance indicators. For example governance indicators
may refer to the separation of functions between stand-
ard setting, monitoring and enforcement. Private regu-
lators that concentrate the functions in one single body
tend to maximize private benefits exacerbating conflicts
of interest between regulators and the regulated; those
which separate them by creating independent monitors
and enforcers increase the chances of internal conflict
but open themselves to external voice ensuring higher
level of transparency. Evidence shows that separation
can also help regulatory dialogue when private enforcers
send signals to standard setters about problems concern-
ing compliance rather than focus on punishment of the
infringers.67
Regulatory objectives can be complex and sometimes
conflicting. Conflicts may arise between private benefits
and social welfare and even within social welfare when
different distributional outcomes may be generated by
alternative regulatory strategies. Performance indicators
can contribute to define ex ante distributional effects
singling out winners and losers or benefits and costs of a
specific regulatory measure. By highlighting these con-
65. Lennox & Nash 2003. Responsible Care has operated up to now with-
out explicit sanctions for malfeasance. As a result, it has reportedly fall-
en victim to enough opportunism that it includes a disproportionate
number of poor performers, and its members do not improve faster
than non-members. Thus, the institutional pressure that Responsible
Care exerts on its members appears to have inadequately counteracted
opportunism. Since Responsible Care represents a leading example of
self-regulation in the world, our findings highlight the difficulty of creat-
ing self-regulation without explicit sanctions.
66. R.D. Morgenstern & W.A. Pizer (eds.), Reality Check: The Nature and
Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs in the United
States, Europe, and Japan, RFF Press, Washington, D.C. 2007.
67. See F. Cafaggi (ed.), The Enforcement of Transnational Regulation,
Edward Elgar, 2012.
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sequences they empower the regulator with information
to make informed choices about conflicting objectives.68
Besides these “genetic problems”, which depend on
statutory goals, the selection of participants and the
multi-stakeholder nature of the initiative, a number of
other effects can undermine the alignment between pri-
vate benefits and social goals during the life of a private
regulatory body. Below, we briefly list them:
• Lock-in effects and collective action problems can
occur when members remain locked into suboptimal
agreements and “focal points”, with no incentive to
change;
• Path dependency, status quo bias, anchoring and
framing effects may lead to shifting focus towards
measurable and immediate benefits rather than long-
term social welfare;
• Hard-to-detect changes over time might be induced
by the prevalence of some interests over others dur-
ing the life of the private regulatory body (e.g.,
MSC, see below)
• Divergence of interests between the regulators and
the regulated, which lead the former to prefer short-
term actions that maximize their likelihood of being
re-appointed;
• Self-indulgence in the evaluation of private regula-
tory bodies, when governance arrangements entail
self-evaluation, or lack of legitimacy of third parties
in charge of evaluation.
All these problems deserve careful scrutiny before one
can actually conclude that a given policy issue is a good
candidate for efficient and socially effective private reg-
ulation.69
68. David Vogel (2010) has recently looked at this notion of effectiveness in
the field of CSR, by arguing that “When compared to most government
regulations in developed countries, civil regulation is clearly less effec-
tive. In fact, civil regulations exhibit many of the well-documented
shortcomings of industry self-regulation at the national level, with
whom they share many important characteristics (Lennox & Nash 2003;
Morgenstern & Pizer 2007; OECD 1999). Both remain weaker than
well-enforced command and control regulations in forcing corporations
to change their behavior … But the effectiveness of civil regulations is
roughly comparable to that of many intergovernmental treaties and
agreements, whose effectiveness in addressing environmental protec-
tion, labor practices, and human rights is also mixed and uneven …
[and] civil regulations are undoubtedly more effective than the labor,
human rights, and environmental regulations of many developing coun-
tries”.
69. For example, Ashby et al. (Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic
Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance, Working paper. Financial
Services Authority, London 2004) distinguished a number of voluntary
regulatory schemes in the UK based on the different context in which
they emerge, which in turn determines a different mode of strategic
interaction between private players. Accordingly, they define the UK
advertising Code as an Assurance Game, the UK Press as a Chicken
game and the UK Life Insurance as a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
3. Towards a Theoretical
Framework for the Appraisal
of Private Governance
Schemes
The fact that private governance schemes can feature
limited alignment with public policy goals raises the
issue of how to evaluate them, when, and how. Again,
from our “transaction cost politics” approach, the evalu-
ation phase of policymaking can be performed centrally
by government, or delegated to specific agencies, or
even externalized to private governance schemes them-
selves, or private meta-regulators. In all these hypothe-
ses, independence is a key factor to ensure effectiveness.
As a matter of fact, there seems to be a lot more self-
evaluation by private regulators today, than external
evaluation by public policymakers. This creates con-
cern, since there is evidence that private regulators, in
many circumstances, can have limited incentives to fully
self-evaluate their effectiveness from a social welfare
perspective. At the same time, concerns become even
bigger since the use of RIA and ex post evaluation tools
to assess the effectiveness of private governance schemes
appears very limited and unsophisticated.
Examples are found in a number of fields. For example,
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting is today an
enormous success as well as a profitable business for
intermediaries and assurance consultants that help com-
panies comply with internationally established stand-
ards.70 Business codes such as the Business Charter for
Sustainable Development developed by the Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce (ICC) are followed by thou-
sands of companies.71 Against this background, the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) sustainability report-
ing is perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to estab-
lish complex and meaningful international standards for
the respect of sustainable development principles.72
However, even if it appears as the prototype of an open,
inclusive organization whose mandate and statutory
objectives are aligned with public policy goals, its per-
formance exhibited so far remarkable problems that are
70. As reported by Vogel (2010), “more than 3,000 global firms now regu-
larly issue reports on the social and environmental practices and many
of these firms have developed their own codes and/or subscribe to one
or more industry or cross-industry codes”. See S. Wood, “Voluntary
Environmental Codes and Sustainability”, in B.J. Richardson & S. Wood,
(eds.), Environmental Law for Sustainability, Hart, Oxford 2006,
pp. 276-277 for a detailed description of the emergence of environ-
mental reporting.
71. For interesting accounts of the emergence of voluntary codes in the
field of corporate social responsibility, see i.e. Wood 2006.
72. The GRI is a private transnational body that has produced the leading
standard for sustainability reporting, used by more than three-quarters
of the Global Fortune 250 companies. Its guidelines include 79 indica-
tors for corporations to report on their social, environmental, and eco-
nomic performance.
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relevant from a public policy perspective.73 In addition,
the formalistic nature of indicators has reportedly led to
the emergence of box-ticking behaviours on the side of
companies participating to the reporting scheme; in the
case of key aspects of sustainability, such as human
rights, this has so far created enormous problems.74
Even more worryingly, the concerns expressed by stake-
holders as regards the inclusiveness and external effec-
tiveness of the current GRI-G3 set of indicators do not
seem to have been the focus of a real reflection inside
GRI, if not limited to the organization’s generic com-
mitment towards constant improvement. The conse-
quence of this rising discontent seems to be the creation
of an additional organization, the International Integra-
ted Reporting Committee, with the aim to create a glob-
ally accepted reporting framework that enables organi-
zations to combine financial and non-financial disclo-
sures.
In the field of trade, the Base Code of the Ethical Trad-
ing Initiative (ETI) is today the globally accepted
benchmark of many workplace labour standards: in 2009
it was applied to 9.4 million workers at 34,720 supplier
sites. Its enforcement and evaluation proceeds through
inspections at the workplace, and ETI members are
required to monitor compliance at their supplier sites
against each Base Code Provision. Despite being a suc-
cessful initiative, also thanks to the official endorsement
of the UK DFID,75 ETI still features difficulties in the
assessment of corporate behavior, problems of represen-
tation of stakeholder groups (especially with respect to
the “North-South” divide and the representation of
73. Vogel 2010; M. Beisheim & K. Dingwerth, Procedural Legitimacy and
Private Transnational Governance – Are the Good Ones Doing Better?,
SFB-Governance Working Paper, Nr. 14, 2008; H.S. Brown, M. de Jong
& T. Lessidrenska, “The Rise of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as a
Case of Institutional Entrepreneurship”, 18 Environmental Politics 2,
2009, pp. 182-200; A. Fonseca, Barriers to Strengthening the Global
Reporting Initiative Framework: Exploring the Perceptions of Consul-
tants, Practitioners, and Researchers 2010, available online at
<www.csin-rcid.ca/downloads/csin_conf_alberto_fonseca.pdf>; Wood
2006.
74. Fonseca (2010) has carried out an empirical analysis among stakehold-
ers to collect feedback on their level of satisfaction with the GRI
scheme, finding evidence of an excessive focus on internal organiza-
tional performance, rather than external impacts; a lack of integrated
indicators; a “credibility gap” due to the discretion left to reporting
firms as to whether to rely on internal or external assurance and verifi-
cation; a worrying lack of guidance on stakeholder engagement, which
ultimately results in limited participation and lack of real inclusiveness.
75. ETI was initially funded by the UK DFID. Although ETI aims at long-
term financial independence, funding from DFID has increased in the
past years, and accounted for 40.1% of the organization’s income
in 2009. DFID assesses the merit of its PPA with ETI also on the basis of
specific indicators. This, however, takes place merely through a self-
assessment document filed by ETI. It is important to reflect on the pecu-
liar type of public-private interaction that takes place between DFID
and ETI: the fact that a public body oversees (though through self-
assessment) and significantly contributes financially to a private regula-
tory scheme makes the ETI a hybrid type of institution, and more similar
to a public-private partnership than to a full-fledged private regulation.
That said, the endorsement (de facto and through funding) of the DFID
seems to have encouraged trust and participation by all types of stake-
holders, including businesses, trade unions and international organiza-
tions. ETI now counts 64 companies, 9 trade unions, and 15 NGOs and
specifically looks at respect for workers’ rights and the maintenance of
decent working conditions.
workers76 unequal power structures between UK retail-
ers and suppliers from developing countries;77 and the
persistence of imbalances of bargaining power between
corporations, workers and trade unions.78 In any case, it
is difficult to assess whether ETI is being evaluated
from the standpoint of its social impacts: internal govern-
ance appears very balanced but also inevitably loose,
with no strong monitoring and sanction mechanisms
linked to any measure of external effectiveness.
In food retail, since the 1990s (also due to scandals such
as the BSE, or “mad cow disease”) multi-national cor-
porations and international organizations have intensi-
fied their dialogue to create global safety standards. Pri-
vate regulatory schemes such as i.e. IFOAM, the Global
Food Safety Initiative, the Sustainable Agriculture Net-
work and the Global Partnership for Good Agricultural
Practice (GlobalGAP); and sectoral initiatives such as
the Forestry Stewardship Council, the Marine Steward-
ship Council, the Aquaculture Certification Council,
etc. have increasingly permeated the supply chain.
However, problems have emerged due to divergences
between the private benefit of members, and the social
impacts of these initiatives. For example, in evaluating
GlobalGAP,79 Kalfagianni and Fuchs (2009) and Kalfa-
gianni (2010) have described a very Europe-dominated,
business-dominated private regulatory scheme, with
outstanding problems in terms of: (i) limited inclusive-
ness; (ii) a very limited participation of external stake-
holders; (iii) a very geographically biased representation
in decision-making bodies; (iv) a trade-off between
stringency and uptake (GlobalGAP had to release cer-
tain requirements in order to elicit more participation);
(v) a lack of detail, which makes a true evaluation of pro-
76. A. Hale, “What hope for ‘ethical’ trade in the globalised garment indus-
try?”, 32 Antipode 4, 2000, pp. 349-356; A. Hale & L.M. Shaw,
“Women workers and the promise of ethical trade in the globalised gar-
ment industry: A serious beginning?”, 33 Antipode 3, 2010,
pp. 510-530.
77. A. Hughes, “Multi-stakeholder Approaches to Ethical Trade: Towards a
reorganisation of UK retailer’s global supply chains?”,  Journal of Eco-
nomic Geography 1, 2001, pp. 421-437.
78. S. Schaller, The Democratic Legitimacy of Private Governance: An
Analysis of the Ethical Trading Initiative, INEF Report 91/2007, Insti-
tute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen 2007.
79. GlobalGap was developed in 1997 by a group of European retailers. Ini-
tially focused on fruits and vegetables, it now covers meat products and
fish from aquaculture as well. Businesses wishing to acquire certification
with GlobalGAP are required to comply with a detailed checklist of
254 questions, divided into 41 “major musts”, 122 “minor musts” and
91 “should” (recommended criteria). In 2008, it had 94,000 certified
producers, up from 18,000 in 2004, representing an increase of approx-
imately 80 percent. More than 20 countries joined in 2008. In total,
over 85 countries are represented. There is significant growth within
European countries, particularly due to French and German supermar-
kets managing to reach out to more producers (GlobalGAP 2009,
21 September 2009). Significant growth is also seen within countries
that hold a (major) global supply position in produce, mainly South Afri-
ca and Chile. Smaller growth is observed in Central and Eastern Europe,
Central America and some African countries (ibid.).
27
DQ 2012 | nr. 1
gress achieved impossible;80 (vi) a lack of progress track-
ing in terms of the evaluation of “external” effective-
ness; and (vii) a potentially negative impact on competi-
tion and local firms (in Africa, several companies report-
edly had to close their business due to the impossibility
to match GlobalGAP standards). The European Com-
mission also found that GlobalGAP imposes dispropor-
tionate costs on operators in developing countries.81
Also more sectoral initiatives such as the FSC and the
MSC have been heavily criticized in the past years.
Despite their attempts to signal attention for external
impacts, they have met with increasing skepticism on
the side of stakeholders. The FSC, in particular, has
been extensively reviewed in the academic literature,
which showed that the initial thrust towards forest pres-
ervation has gradually shifted due to growing capture by
business interests, geographic imbalances and reduced
de facto representation of NGOs and other stakeholders.
3.1 The Rise of Private Meta-Regulators
The growing importance of private regulation in fields
such as sustainability and food quality and safety, cou-
pled with the rising concerns that such organizations do
not fully pursue public goals, recently led to the creation
of meta-organizations and – even more recently – meta-
standardization as a way to bridge the gap between pri-
vate regulatory schemes and public policymakers. An
important example in this respect is certainly the
ISEAL Alliance, an international non-profit organi-
zation that codifies best practices for the design and
implementation of social and environmental standards
initiatives. This is a landmark example of what we call a
80. This is the case for i.e. environmental well-being indicators such as the
quality of irrigation water (except for sewage water which is a major
must in all versions), recycling and re-use, impact of farming on the
environment and wildlife and conservation policies, while constituted
minor musts in 2001, are mere recommendations in 2004 and remain
so today (see also van der Grijp et al. 2005). This has occurred in other
private initiatives, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), where
the participation of big retailers led to the introduction of varying levels
of stringency in the FSC due to the inability to meet the market demand
of their supply chains (van Waarden 2010).
81. See SEC(2009)670, 28 May 2009: “Costs and benefits of participating
in the GlobalGAP assurance scheme to operators in developing coun-
tries have been estimated for Kenya, Zambia and Uganda. In general,
the studies conclude that small-scale growers need external support (by
donors or exporters) to be able to afford certification, costs of which in
the case of Kenya are in the range of 636 GBP for establishment and
175 GBP per annum to maintain. In Zambia, establishment costs per
grower even amounted to 4664 GBP for initial investment and 938 GBP
per annum for maintenance costs. In Uganda, the study concludes that
an export company would have to sell an additional 53 tonnes of horti-
cultural products to break even (18% more for a company exporting
300 tonnes per annum). Farmers would have to increase their produc-
tion by about 0.1 to 0.3 acres to compensate for additional costs
through higher net income”.
“private meta-regulator”.82 In its activity as a “standard
for standards”, the ISEAL Alliance develops codes of
good practice that seem to be reaching out to interna-
tional organizations and important supranational insti-
tutions. Important recognitions have come recently
from the European Commission in its Communication
on Fair Trade (2009); from the UNCTAD Recommen-
dations of the conference “Making Sustainability Stand-
ards Work for Small-scale Farmers”; from the European
Parliament’s resolution on “Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: Implementing the Partnership for Growth and
Jobs”;83 from the WWF/World Bank “Forest Certifica-
tion Assessment Guide” published in 2006; and from
FAO’s Guidelines on Ecolabelling of Marine Fishery
Products (2005). The European Environmental Bureau
(2010) declared in 2010 that they “consider (ISEAL’s
Standard-Setting Code) a model of reference for multi-
stakeholder processes, especially in the area of public
policy implementation”.
Besides a Standard-Setting code and an Assurance
Code, recently the ISEAL Alliance launched an impor-
tant tool that goes in the direction of an evaluation of the
external impact of private regulatory bodies. The Code
of Good Practice for Assessing the Impacts of Social
and Environmental Standard (“Impacts Code”) sets out
the process by which standards systems can provide evi-
dence of their contributions to social and environmental
impacts as well as learning about and improving the
effectiveness of their system. Interestingly, the Code
appears strikingly similar to an Impact Assessment
guidance developed by public policymakers.84
Figure 3 shows the theoretical framework for evaluation
proposed by the ISEAL Impacts Code, which mirrors
existing methods of ex post evaluation of projects,
expenditure programmes and policies by public bodies.
For example, the MSC has recently launched a consul-
tation on the evaluation of its effectiveness and out-
82. ISEAL Alliance members includes both the FSC and the MSC, who com-
mitted to compliance with the Code of ISEAL Good Practice. Other
founding members include Fairtrade Labelling Organizations Interna-
tional (FLO), the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Move-
ments (IFOAM), the International Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS);
the Marine Aquarium Council (MAC); the Rainforest Alliance; Social
Accountability International (SAI); Social Accountability Accreditation
Services (SAAS), the Union for Ethical BioTrade (UEBT) and UTZ Certi-
fied. To become a full member of the ISEAL Alliance, members have to
demonstrate full compliance with ISEAL Codes of Good Practice and
other applicable ISO Guides (e.g., ISO17011 for Accreditation Bodies).
Organizations interested in membership will first apply for Associate
Membership, and have to successfully complete a pre-assessment.
ISEAL has historically relied upon three sources of funding – govern-
mental agencies, foundations and membership fees. It works in partner-
ship with AccountAbility and PwC Germany to improve its global out-
reach.
83. Resolution P6_TA(2007)0062, 2007.
84. Users can find definitions, glossaries, methodologies and tips for use of
data sources and monitoring and evaluation arrangements. For exam-
ple, the Code explains that the evaluation “could also be an assessment
of the effectiveness of the standards system, either in respect of its
internal structure (eg financial management) or of its ability to provide
tangible benefits and incentives (eg fair prices) for its participants”, thus
to some extent mirroring our definition of “private benefit” v. “social
welfare”.
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comes based on the ISEAL Code.85 There, the MSC
has proposed to use the ISEAL Impacts Code, by iden-
tifying specific goals and issues for its own sector.
The development of an Impacts Code on the side of the
ISEAL Alliance certainly fills a gap in the international
policy and global governance debate, which culminates
in the lack of a suitable definition of sustainability. In
this respect, ISEAL has gone even further by engaging
with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in
the quest for a globally accepted definition of sustaina-
bility. As a matter of fact, while the ISEAL Impacts
Code primarily looks at the stakeholder of a given pri-
vate governance scheme (e.g., the MSC), the conceptual
framework definition provided by ISEAL aims to repre-
sent a “universally applicable definition of sustainabili-
ty”.86 This development – termed within the ISEAL
Alliance “scaling-up” of their current efforts – corre-
sponds to a long-term plan to involve public and private
organizations and trigger a common definition of core
sustainability values, starting from the Brundtland
Commission’s report of 1987 “Our Common Future”
and continuing with the incorporation of previous vol-
untary certification systems (FLO, MSC, UTZ Certi-
fied); tools generated by UN bodies (UN/ECOSOC,
FAO, ILO, UNEP, etc.); corporations (e.g., WalMart
Sustainability Index); NGOs (e.g., Transparency Inter-
national, the Bellagio STAMP); and academia (e.g., the
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report by the Commission on the
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Pro-
gress).
Within this context, a definition of sustainability has
emerged, which can be considered at the moment
among the most sophisticated and widely acknowledged
definition to be used for public policy purposes. More
in detail, sustainability has been articulated along four
key dimensions/preconditions: good governance; social
development; environmental integrity and economic





86. FAO-ISEAL (2010), A conceptual framework for progressing towards
sustainability in the agriculture and food sector, authored by E. Gutten-
stein, N. El-Hage Scialabba, J. Loh & S. Courville, available online at
<www.fao.org/docrep/012/al322e/al322e00.pdf>.
ticipation” indicators – i.e. reflecting the degree of
active participation by interested parties in local man-
agement and decision-making – and “transparency”
indicators, including indicators on the three core dimen-
sions of “Assessment”, “Prevention of Corruption” and
“Compliance”.87 The “economic resilience” indicators,
on the other hand, incorporate dimensions of “secure
livelihoods” (including poverty alleviation and meas-
ured as on average per capita income of the farm, forest-
ry, or fishery enterprise); resilience to economic risk
(measured as degree of diversification of funding
sources); inclusivity of the value chain and various social
capital indicators. “Social development” encompasses a
wide array of sub-indicators, from right to food and use
of resources to labour rights, non-discrimination and
equity (including gender equality), access to education
and knowledge, health and access to sanitation and
respect for cultural identity. Finally, the “environmental
integrity” dimension looks at impacts on air, water, land
and soil, biodiversity, climate change and eco-efficiency.
The joint FAO-ISEAL definition of sustainability indi-
cators is certainly still an ongoing exercise, as testified
by the many definitions that are still pending. However,
it represents at once a promising avenue for public-pri-
vate cooperation in global governance, and also the
implicit recognition that private governance can signifi-
cantly contribute to the design, implementation and
enforcement of tools that aim at pursuing public policy
objectives. The spider graph developed by FAO and
ISEAL (Figure 4) shows the relative strengths of
NGOs, government and businesses on the various indi-
cators of sustainability described above. The figure
shows, in particular, that key governance indicators
such as participation, transparency and ongoing assess-
ment are more likely to fall in the remit of governments,
rather than NGOs and businesses.
3.2 Towards a Theoretical Evaluation Model
The previous sections have described the rise of trans-
national private regulation as a dominant paradigm in
several policy domains; the absence of a real framework
for the evaluation of these governance schemes by pub-
87. The latter indicators are tentatively based on the availability of social-
economic and environmental information relating to the business,
enterprise or policy intervention, including monitoring data, manage-
ment plans, and financial accounts. See FAO-ISEAL (2010).
Figure 3. Methodology for the Evaluation Based on the ISEAL Code
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lic policymakers; and the ongoing “gap-filling” by meta-
regulators that help private organizations set their own
goals and converge towards public policy objectives. In
all this, the informational asymmetries that remain
between private players and public policymakers suggest
that it would not be efficient, on the side of public poli-
cy, to abdicate the task of monitoring and evaluation and
to delegate it entirely to private meta-regulators. Evi-
dence from past experience (e.g., the FSC, GlobalGAP)
suggests that the role of public policymakers should
remain crucial in the context of global governance of key
areas such as the ones mentioned in this paper (food,
sustainability, fundamental rights, financial markets, IT,
etc.).
The evaluation of private governance schemes in public
regulation can take place in different phases of the poli-
cy cycle. When self- or co-regulatory schemes are pro-
posed in response to action by public policymakers, of
course they will form part of the available regulatory
options to be compared in an ex ante RIA. However, as
already clarified, this is not always the case: many pri-
vate governance schemes are created independently of
public regulation, and this leads commentators to often
exclude the possibility that a systematic monitoring of
private governance by public regulators could ever take
place. At the same time, there might be cases in which
scrutiny by a regional or national policymaker is not
very helpful, due to the global nature of private govern-
ance arrangements.
Both these arguments, however, are not conclusive.
Monitoring does not coincide with oversight. Incentives
to monitor existing private schemes may serve the pur-
pose of deciding if and what kind of public intervention
is needed. More in detail, the evolution of the smart
regulation agenda, especially in the EU, increasingly
points at “closing the policy cycle”, and thus at engag-
ing in constant monitoring of the effects of existing reg-
ulatory schemes – whether public or private – through
the use of indicators and a sequential, logically consis-
tent use of ex ante, interim and ex post evaluation.88
Moreover, the fact that private governance arrange-
ments tend to be global certainly implies that the best
possible response would in many cases be an appraisal
by international bodies or through public regulatory
cooperation; however, nothing prevents a national or
regional policymaker from assessing whether certain
international rules are sufficient or desirable with
respect to its own public policy goals.
That said, we conceived our overall evaluation frame-
work along a number of sequential steps.
Step 1 Origin and type of private governance. As
explained in the previous sections, most private
schemes are not generated by policy decisions;
at the same time, there is a variety of schemes
dealing with one, a sub-set, or all phases of the
policy cycle (described using the ANIME
framework as in Figure 2 above). This deter-
mines the depth and scope of the evaluation to
be performed. At the same time, the description
of the type of initiative could take into account
the reasons for the creation of the private govern-
ance scheme (signaling, controlling the value
chain, complementing public regulation, replac-
ing/pre-empting public regulation, inter-firm
coordination and co-opetition, collusion/mutual
benefit, etc.), which in turn orients the direction
of the assessment.
Step 2 Governance preconditions. The analysis of exist-
ing experiences in the literature suggests that a
number of governance features can positively
affect the performance of private governance
schemes. This phase implies the assessment of
the preconditions for the effectiveness of a pri-
vate governance scheme from a public policy
standpoint. As such, it includes the use of indi-
88. See the European Commission Communication on Smart Regulation in
the EU, COM(2010) 543 (8 October 2010).
Figure 4. Relative Commitment and Strength for Sustainability
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cators such as participation, materiality, com-
pleteness, diversity of funding, specific govern-
ance arrangements, internal use of indicators
and existence of self-evaluation or external eval-
uation arrangements.89
Step 3 Quality, legitimacy, enforcement. This step of the
framework entails the analysis of how the
arrangements identified in step 2 possibly affect
these three key dimensions of private govern-
ance.90
Step 4 Effectiveness. Three different types of indicators
seem relevant for an evaluation of the effective-
ness of private governance: (i) activity and gov-
ernance indicators. Indicators that correlate gov-
ernance features and regulatory activities of the
private governance scheme; (ii) compliance indi-
cators, i.e. indicators used as means of reporting
and signaling compliance with statutory goals
helping verifying consistency between means
and goals; and (iii) impact indicators, which
include criteria and indicators used to evaluate
the performance of private regulatory schemes
and their impact on different constituen-
cies – e.g., whether the expected distributional
consequences have occurred or wealth transfers
are needed to correct unexpected effects. These
latter “meta-indicators”, in particular, are useful
for public policymakers to understand whether
private regulators evaluate themselves on the
basis of “private” effectiveness.
Step 5 Incorporation in public policy appraisal. The eval-
uation of the effectiveness of private governance
arrangements becomes an important input to the
forms of public evaluation of policy options that
are available, for example at the EU level.
Depending on the results of previous steps, the
most appropriate tools that will host the evalua-
tion will be an ex ante analysis, an interim or ex
post evaluation. In addition, it is important that a
number of additional filters are applied to pri-
vate governance. These include a number of
screens, normally available (although not yet
fully developed) in the European Commission’s
impact assessment practice:
• Competition assessment: the interaction of
competitors within private governance
schemes can lead to forms of collusion and
anticompetitive outcomes; at the same time,
vertical agreements that are aimed at secur-
ing private benefit might not always con-
verge towards a virtuous outcome – take the
example of GlobalGAP, or private agree-
ments between ISPs and content providers
for copyright enforcement in cyberspace.
Competition assessment tools have been
89. An example of a paper that uses indicators to assess the existence of
such preconditions is Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010.
90. See above, beginning of section 2 for a definition of these three dimen-
sions.
developed by the OECD over the past few
years, and are still insufficiently used in ex
ante policy appraisal.91 They could be put to
use with the aim to assess whether the pri-
vate governance scheme at hand are likely to
hamper the competitive process by raising
non-participants’ costs, worsen barriers to
entry of expansion, raise prices above com-
petitive levels, etc. These tools can be
designed in a way that mirrors current
knowledge in competition law enforcement,
such as for example the assessment of the
existence of basic preconditions for stable
collusion (transparency, symmetry, enforce-
ment/retaliation, homogeneity of products,
etc.).
• SIA. The sustainability impact assessment
methodology has been developed and
applied at the EU level mostly along with the
negotiation of free trade agreements.92 This
toolkit is conceived to assess a variety of sus-
tainability-related consequences starting
from negotiations pure related to trade. As
such, it has developed in a way that accounts
for private governance schemes, as well as
constant consultation and involvement of
public and private partners. The European
Commission has used the tools in a number
of occasions, including in the development of
its new strategy on tourism and horticulture,
as well as in international trade negotiations
with several partners.93
• Crime-proofing. A methodology for testing
proposed legislation against the likelihood of
criminal behavior has been developed by the
TRANSCRIME project.94 For example, one
of the applications led the authors to find
that the eAccessibility communication of the
European Commission left the regulation of
online payment systems to self-regulation,
without fully assessing the impact that this
policy option would exert on security and
crime.
• Fundamental rights test. A specific methodol-
ogy to assess impacts of proposed policy
options on fundamental rights is available
since May 2011 on the Commission’s web-
site. This methodology includes a funda-
mental rights check-list, which – although
not very detailed – could guide the assess-
91. See the OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit 2007 (revised in 2010).
92. C. George & C. Kirkpatrick, Sustainability Impact Assessment of Trade
Agreements: From Public Dialogue to International Governance, Impact
Assessment Research Centre Working Paper Series No 22/2007, Uni-
versity of Manchester.
93. <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.
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ment of various policy options with respect
to certain, “non-negotiable” issues.95
• Specific risk assessment. This test could be
designed as focusing on “what can go
wrong” with private governance. As we
described in section 2 above, depending on
the circumstances lock-in effects and collec-
tive action problems, path dependency, sta-
tus quo bias, anchoring and framing effects,
hard-to-detect changes, divergence of inter-
ests and self-indulgence in the evaluation can
emergep, thus undermining the effectiveness
of a private governance scheme.
• Sectoral competitiveness proofing. This test
was recently added by the European Com-
mission to the toolkit to be used within an ex
ante impact assessment of a new policy ini-
tiative.96 However, the European Commis-
sion clarified in its recent working paper that
“[i]n the case of policy interventions of a
self-regulatory nature (such as codes of con-
duct, or voluntary standards), the case for an
in-depth analysis of impacts on sectoral com-
petitiveness is likely to be limited since the
sector itself plays a key role in determining
the content of the initiative. However, more
detailed scrutiny may be required with
regard to impacts on competition within the
sector and on the competitiveness of
upstream or downstream sectors”. Given our
approach to private regulation, this “non-
interference” approach appears unfortunate:
to the contrary, the competitiveness impact
of a given private regulation scheme must be
carefully appraised.
• Overall policy coherence test. Most important
of all, from the standpoint of public policy it
is essential to assess whether private govern-
ance schemes have set operational and spe-
cific objectives, which are consistent with the
long-term goal set by public policymakers.
For example, the EU has set important long-
term goals related to competitiveness, inno-
vation, poverty and sustainability within its
Europe 2020 strategy and the seven flagship
initiatives that compose it. Even if fully
effective, private governance schemes might
not be fully aligned with the public goals set
within given jurisdictions, which set targets
that might require additional policy inter-
vention. The use of policy appraisal tools, be
they ex ante or ex post, is essential to test
95. <http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/key_docs/docs/sec_2011_
0567_en.pdf>.
96. See European Commission Staff Working Document, Operational Guid-
ance For Assessing Impacts On Sectoral Competitiveness Within The
Commission Impact Assessment System, A “Competitiveness Proofing”
Toolkit for use in Impact Assessments, SEC(2012)91 final, 27 Janu-
ary 2012.
this form of alignment between private gain,
social benefits and policy targets.
This theoretical framework can easily accommodate the
use of at least three different types of indicators, which
have been advocated in the literature. First, governance
indicators can be used at step 3 of our proposed analyti-
cal framework to enable an analysis of whether the basic
preconditions for effective private regulation exist. Per-
formance indicators can be used at step 4 of the analysis
to assess effectiveness directly. Finally, distributional
impact indicators are essential in step 5 of the analysis,
when the overall impact of the private governance
scheme is assessed.97
4. Conclusion
Private regulation is emerging as a viable solution for a
number of problems faced by contemporary societies,
and can be superior to traditional command and control
regulation due to informational asymmetries, superior
coordination, the need for trans-national cooperation
and standardization, and also the superior flexibility and
adaptability of de-ossified, privately implemented,
designed and enforced rules. This development is, how-
ever, still largely ignored by guidance documents on ex
ante policy appraisal for public policymakers; mean-
while, private regulators themselves are developing their
own guidance documents, even in the form of meta-pri-
vate regulation offered by emerging conglomerates such
as the ISEAL Alliance. In this paper, we try to propose
a theoretical framework that could guide public policy-
makers in assessing whether, and in what form, private
regulation can prove the most appropriate form of poli-
cy intervention. A key role in this respect is to be attrib-
uted to the assessment of the effectiveness of private
regulation as an alternative or more likely as a comple-
ment to public regulation. We propose a six-step theo-
retical framework and argue that IA techniques should:
a) Define an integrated framework including both the pos-
sibility that private regulation can be used as an alter-
native or as a complement to public legislation. This, in
turn, calls for a taxonomy of the many ways in which
public and private regulation can coexist along a con-
tinuum, from extreme cases in which private regula-
tors take care of most of the policy process (from
agenda-setting to the setting of basic principles,
implementation criteria, enforcement practices and
compliance monitoring); to more hybrid (and also
more recurrent) cases in which public policymakers
set the ultimate objectives and principles, and pri-
vate governance complements them by setting
modes of implementation and compliance (as in the
case of standardization policy at the EU level).
b) Involve private parties in public IAs. When the use of
private regulation is contemplated by public policy-
97. F. Cafaggi & K. Pistor, The Distributional Consequences of Transna-
tional Regulation 2012 (unpublished, on file with the authors).
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makers, private regulators should be asked to con-
tribute to the IA exercise in order to define the best
strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement
of the regulatory objectives. This of course can hap-
pen only when public regulators intentionally leave
at least part of the policy space to action by private
regulators, and not in all those cases in which private
governance emerges in the absence of the law.
c) Contemplate the deployment of indicators related to
governance and activities of the regulators and their
ability to coordinate and solve disputes with other regu-
lators. Although indicators are widespread in private
governance, we contend that there might be signifi-
cant differences between the effectiveness perceived
by a private governance scheme (in the form of “pri-
vate payoff” of the members) and the ability of the
same scheme to achieve publicly set regulatory
objectives (the “social benefits” of private regula-
tion). Using indicators oriented towards the private
benefit to measure progress towards the achievement
of public goals would inevitably prove misleading:
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” does not always
work that smoothly. Accordingly, various types of
indicators (governance, impacts, distributional
effects) must be used to assess compliance with over-
all regulatory objectives.
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